itself of responsibility for the safe transport of reprocessed waste derived from this plutonium. Regarding our request for an inquiry into the safety of the impending shipment, we attach Dr. Lyman's

is shipped to Britain and France for "reprocessing," and the recovered plutonium is shipped to Japan as MOX fuel. 2. Why is Japan using MOX fuel? Japan is turning to MOX fuel for its light-water, nuclear

now that Japan appears to have committed itself to reprocessing its nuclear wastes and acquiring a stockpile of plutonium.2 These shipments from France to Japan (and back) present hazards that are of

plutonium separated from spent nuclear fuel by means of reprocessing---so-called reactor-grade plutonium---can indeed be used to build reliable nuclear weapons with enormous explosive yield. Japan currently

The waste comes from the "reprocessing" of spent nuclear fuel in France and Britain to obtain plutonium for Japan. Plutonium is a costly and non-essential fuel for generating electricity, but an essential

heavily shielded reprocessing plant The most secure way to ensure that plutonium disposition could not be reversed would be for the United States and Russia to agree to a mutually verified shutdown of

plutonium, and high-level reprocessing wastes (HLW), albeit only as a voluntary Code of Practice. Whether the INF Code is necessary (or sufficient) therefore depends on the extent to which the standards

reprocessing" of spent fuel from Japanese reactors to produce plutonium fuel. Future shipments could contain over 100 tons of waste each. Plutonium is a non-essential fuel for producing electricity, an

some 263 kilograms a year in a large spent-fuel reprocessing plant. That is enough plutonium to make dozens of nuclear bombs. The IAEA is supposed to provide prompt detection of the loss of one bombs

plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The degree to which a fissile material convention can prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, therefore, hinges on its ability to limit the production of, and